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Abstract
This study estimates the impact of migrants’ remittances on households’ spending
decisions in Ecuador. Applying both parametric and semiparametric techniques, we
find strong evidence that remittances enhance expenditures on education, health, and
housing, but decrease expenditures on food. This supports the hypotheses that these
inflows result in a stronger human capital accumulation and therefore improve the
long-run production possibilities. We do not find strong differences in the impact on
expenditure patterns of male and female household heads. The sex of the remitter and
the receiver affects the expenditure behavior only slightly.
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1 Introduction
Ecuador has experienced a massive emigration which is mainly motivated by economic
factors. After several crises, and therefore high poverty, unemployment, and few eco-
nomic prospects, the emigration rate increased strongly since the end of the 1980s.
Destination countries are the United States and Europe, especially Spain. Current emi-
gration from Ecuador is mostly illegal and therefore expensive and permanent. A migrant
has to pay to a facilitator between US$ 10,000 and US$ 14,000 to travel to the United
States (Soruco et al. (2008)). Often the whole family takes a loan to finance migration, and
first remittances are often used for repaying these loans. Main motivation for most of the
Ecuadorian migrants is thus not the prospect of a better life in another country, but the
possibility to provide financial support for relatives in the home country (Pew Hispanic
Center and Benedixen and Associates (2003)).
Migration and migrants’ remittances take an important position in the economy of
Ecuador. In 2006, remittances account for 7 percent of GDP. The inflows have the poten-
tial to reduce poverty, liquidity constraints, and income volatility. Moreover, they can
increase household expenditures on education and health, categories which are consid-
ered as especially important for economic development. Women form an increasing part
of the migratory movement, whether as migrants, who send remittances, or as head of
the households, who receive international transfers. The impact of remittances depends
mainly on their use, and the literature suggests gender-specific preferences in the use
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of income. The aim of this study is to examine, whether remittances-receiving house-
holds have higher expenditures on education and health, and how this relationship is
affected by female bargaining power. To this end, we evaluate the impact of (i) remit-
tances on households’ expenditure patterns, (ii) the gender of the household head who
receives remittances, and (iii) the gender of the individual who sends and who receives
remittances.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section briefly summa-
rizes the impact of remittances on development. It also examines the most salient results
from the intra-household expenditure literature. Section three presents the data. Section
four describes the empirical approach, and the parametric and semiparametric estimation
procedures in particular. Moreover, the econometric strategies to identify the impacts of
remittances and gender are explained. The fifth section discusses the results and relates
them to the literature. The final section concludes.
2 Remittances and gender
International migrants moving from developing to developed countries get acquainted
with a different society, other social norms, and newmarkets in the destination countries.
Their preference on the use of income may change, and so may the expenditure behavior
of the households in the home country. Several studies indeed find that remittance receipt
increases household expenditures on education and health (a detailed review will be given
in section 5.1), categories which are considered as especially important for economic
development. On the one hand, remittances decrease liquidity constraints, and therefore
allow households to invest more in the education of their children, as well as they reduce
the need for child labor (McKenzie and Rapoport (2011)). Due to their counter-cyclical
nature the international transfers reduce income risk and smooth consumption. Espe-
cially when capital markets are weak this is important to allow investments in human
capital (Calero et al. (2009)). An additional important factor influencing the labor force
is health. Empirical evidence suggests an increase due to remittance receipt which is
partly explained by an increased knowledge about health related issues (Hildebrandt and
McKenzie (2005); López-Córdova et al. 2005).
Migration and remittances are expected to change the bargaining power within the
family which may affect the allocation of household expenditures. In the traditional
unitary-household theory, households are units that have a sole preference and pool all
resources. However, every member of the household has own preferences. If a house-
hold contains more than one individual, the individual consumption depends on the
bargaining power (Duflo and Udry (2004)). Several empirical studies have tested the uni-
tary household theory. Although the impact differs between countries, there is still a
common structure: more resources controlled by women enhance expenses on house-
hold wellbeing, especially those for children and on education increase (Mason and King
(2001); Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000)). Using data from Cote d’Ivoire, Hoddinott and
Haddad (1995) find evidence that a greater share of household’ income controlled by
women results in more expenditures on food, and less on alcohol and cigarettes. These
results are in line with the findings from a study of Doss (2006). Moreover, not only the
share of expenditure devoted to food or education increases with a higher female bar-
gaining power, but also the corresponding outcomes improve such as infant mortality,
schooling or nutrition (Thomas (1990)). In a nutshell, a strong female intra-household
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bargaining power seems to increase expenses on education, health, and food. This is one
reason for development approaches to focus on transferring income to women. Women
marry at an earlier age, have a higher life-expectancy, and therefore outlive their hus-
bands. As they have to rely on their children for old-age support during a longer period,
this behavior is rational (Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000)).
Summing up the literature that focuses on gender-specific motivations for remittances,
women seem to function as insurers for their families and tend to prefer their remittances
to be spent on education and health, while male remitters prefer investments in housing
and other assets (see for a review Guzmán et al. (2008)). Though the migrant may intend
his/her remittances to be spent in a certain way, he/she is not physically present in the ori-
gin household and cannot fully monitor his behavior (a typical principal-agent problem).
Hence, the use of remittances reflects the preferences of the remitter and the receiving
household. In a Mexican case study, for example, Pfeiffer and Taylor (2008) reveal that
households with a female remitter invest a smaller share of total expenditures on educa-
tion than households with a male remitter. This stands in contrast to the assumption that
female remitters prefer their remittances to be spent on education. The authors conclude
that this result may be due to the intra-household bargaining power: since women cannot
monitor the education of their children, female migration leads to smaller expenses on
education, in spite of remittances.
3 Data
This study uses data from the Living Standards Survey round five in Ecuador Encuesta
Condiciones de Vida - Quinta Ronda (ECV-5), collected by the National Statistic and
Census Institute (INEC) in 2005/2006. The data set comprises 13,581 households. In the
following analysis, households from the Amazonas region are excluded which reduces the
sample slightly to 12,491 households.1 Incomes and expenditures have been collected in
annual, monthly, weekly, and daily values, and we convert all amounts to an annual level.
Several households receive numerous products for free, which is especially true for food
products and poor households. Due to poverty, food is often grown in private gardens or
received from the employer as remuneration. Consequently, these households have small
expenditures on food. Yet, monetary values for these costless products are available. In
the estimation sample, we count them twice, once as income and at the same time as
expenditure.2 We aggregate expenditure data from the survey into two consumption cat-
egories (food and housing), two types of human capital investment (education and health)
and one other (miscellaneous) category (see Table 1 for more details on the categories).
We restrict the empirical analysis to households with positive expenditures on food and
housing (which reduces the sample size very slightly to 12,488 observations).
Table 1 Dependent variables
Variable Definition Examples Mean = 0*
Food Purchases and non-purchased food Bread, milk, gifts 0.50 0.00
Housing Real estates, rent with related costs Rent expenses, water, gas 0.18 0.00
Education Educational expenses Registration fees, books 0.03 0.10
Health Health expenses Doctor fees, medicine 0.05 0.34
Other Miscellaneous Durable goods, luxuries 0.24 0.00
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the ECV-5.
Note: *% of households have zero expenditure in this category.
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Although the survey provides detailed data on socio-demographic characteristics, it
is not a specialized survey of remittances or migration. Therefore, it does not contain
comprehensive data on migrants. Only migrants that have left the country after 2000 are
captured by the survey, and basic data such as age, gender, education, and destination
country are available. These migrants (560 men and 470 women) tend to be more edu-
cated than the Ecuadorian average, and female migrants have a higher educational level
than their male counterparts. Spain is the main migration destination, accounting for 47
(58) percent of all male (female) migrants. The United States attract 40 percent of all male,
but only 24 percent of all female migrants. These gender-specific migration flows result
from a gender-specific demand in the destination countries.3 Almost half (45 percent) of
themigrants (of both genders) leaveminor children in the responsibility of the households
in Ecuador. This may partly explain the high incidence of remittances: 76 (74) percent of
the households with a male (female) migrant receive the inflows. International transfers
to households with a male migrant are substantially higher (US$ 2040) than those towards
households with a female migrant (US$ 1500).4 Yet, households do not explicitly indicate
the remitter. If a male household member has migrated after 2000, one may assume the
remitter to be male. Conversely, it may be that not the male migrant is the remitter, but is
in fact another person who migrated before 2000.
The effect of migration on expenditure patterns cannot be observed due to the lack of
data on migrants. However, the impact of remittances can be evaluated, since the data
set contains comprehensive information on remittances, including the amount remitted,
the frequency in which remittances are received, as well as the source country. An addi-
tional analysis of the impact of the gender of the migrant on expenditure patterns can be
drawn on a subsample of 616 households. These households receive remittances and have
household members who migrated after 2000.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics from the ECV-5, disaggregated by gender and
remittance receipt. Of the 12,491 households included in the sample, 16 percent receive
remittances. In terms of gender, 21 percent of the households in the sample are female
headed, and differences in comparison with male headed households are present; while
per-capita expenditures are similar in non-receiving households (US$ 1520), women have
a higher expenditure level in remittance receiving households (US$ 1640 and US$ 1800,
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Remittance receipt All households Male-headed hh. Female-headed hh.
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Per-capita expenditures 1517 1695 1517 1641 1517 1803
Household size 4.06 4.20 4.24 4.45 3.27 3.71
No. females >= 15 1.34 1.56 1.29 1.48 1.58 1.72
No. males >= 15 1.28 1.26 1.44 1.58 0.62 0.61
No. children < 15 1.43 1.38 1.52 1.39 1.06 1.38
No. adults >= 15 with prim. educ. 1.22 1.14 1.27 1.23 0.99 0.94
No. adults >= 15 with sec. educ. 0.73 0.91 0.77 1.00 0.59 0.72
No. adults >= 15 with tert. educ. 0.40 0.57 0.42 0.63 0.34 0.46
Household head married (%) 72.78 65.79 87.97 87.03 7.93 24.03
Partner of hh. head absent (%)* 1.26 12.54 0.73 2.01 25.95 87.58
Observations 10,503 1,988 8,510 1,318 1,993 670
Source: Authors’ analysis based on the ECV-5.
Note: * given that the head is married.
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respectively). Female headed households have one family member less, the head is rarely
married, and if she is, the partner is absent in most cases. The incidence of female house-
hold heads is about twice as high in remittance-receiving household. Women seem to be




How remittances affect development depends mainly on their use. The aim of this study
is to examine whether remittances-receiving households have higher expenditures on
education and health, and how this relationship is affected by female bargaining power.
Several previous studies have contributed to a pessimistic perception by observing that
the inflows are mainly used for food and current expenses (for a review, see Chami et al.
(2003)). Yet, remittances - like any other source of income - are fungible and increase total
income. Even if they are not directly invested in human capital, they can lower liquidity
constraints, and hence other sources of income may be invested. Thus, the whole expen-
diture pattern of the households has to be examined. Recent studies include a remittances
variable as a regressor in a system of household demand equations (e.g. Zarate-Hoyos
(2004), Taylor and Mora (2006) and Adams and Cuecuecha (2010)). An advantage of this
approach is its consistency with consumer demand models which assume that income
from diverse sources is pooled. One disadvantage is the potential endogeneity of remit-
tances, which has to be addressed. Migration (and consequently remittance receipt)
selects on both, observable and unobservable characteristics. To address the endogeneity
of remittances, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is applied.
After analyzing the impact of remittances on household’s budget allocation, a gender-
dimension is taken into account. The first challenge is to find a variable that measures
intra-household bargaining power. Exogenous variables typically used to measure female
bargaining power, like wealth upon marriage, are not stated in the ECV-5. Following
Guzmán et al. (2008), the best proxy available is the sex of the household head. How-
ever, the gender of the household head is correlated with explanatory variables which
implies that gender (as remittances) is endogenous. As no reasonable instrument for gen-
der exists, we apply a matching procedure to make male and female headed households
comparable, and run separate regressions.
In the third part of the analysis, the impact of the gender of the migrant and the receiver
is evaluated. To this end, we focus on a subsample of 616 remittance-receiving households
with migrants. Here, the mentioned principal-agent problem can arise as the household
in the home country is in fact spending the transfer. In spite of possibly gender-specific
preferences of the migrants, these may not be reflected in the use of remittances.
4.2 Econometric model
In the empirical analysis, a proper functional form for the econometric model has to be
chosen. A popular form is theWorking-Leser curve which relates budget shares linearly to
the logarithm of total household expenditures and additional variables (Working (1943);
Leser (1963)).5 In this study, the model is specified as follows:
wij = αi + βilog xjnj + ψilog(nj) + ηij + θiRj + ij, (1)
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or in a shorter notation
wij = μiXj + ij, (2)
where wij is the budget share of expenditure category i by household j, xj is total house-
hold expenditures, nj is household size (thus xjnj is per-capita expenditures). The term
j is a vector of household characteristics that may affect expenditure behavior, Rj cap-
tures whether the household receives remittances, and ij is an error term. In the short
notation Xj represents all right hand side variables of the model including the intercept.
The dependent variables reflect the categories of household expenditures, namely “food”,
“housing”, “education”, and “health”. Not every household has expenditures on each cate-
gory which implies censored dependent variables. Expenditure on a category is observed
only if the household’s desired expenditure exceeds some threshold which depends on the
lumpiness of the goods as well as the opportunity cost. Estimation techniques that fail to
consider the censoring of the dependent variables give rise to biased parameter estimates.
Thus, the following participation equation is added to equation (2):
w∗ij = γiZj + uij. (3)
The dependent variable w∗ij is unobservable, but has an observable realization of one if
wij takes on a positive value and zero otherwise. The term Zj is a vector that contains all
explanatory variables included in equation (2), and some additional variables which allow
for identification, and uij is an error term.6 In addition, the budget shares are not inde-
pendent of each other. A positive shock in the budget share “food”, for example, results in
higher expenses on “food” which leads to smaller expenses in at least one other budget
share. The error terms across equations are correlated. The model is an equation system
with dependent variables censored by latent variables.
Estimating a censored system of equations is no easy task. Until 1999, the popular
Heien and Wessells (1990) two-step estimation procedure was considered the standard
approach. Yet, Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) (henceforth SY) point out an inconsistency and
show that this estimator performs poorly in Monte Carlo simulations. They hence sug-
gest an alternative, consistent two-step estimator which has found wide applicability in
empirical work as it has a solid theoretical foundation and is easy to implement. In the
first step, the probability of participation in each expenditure category is estimated using
a probit regression. The results are then used in the second step, to weight the expen-
diture equations in the system, and to construct a selection term. Despite its popularity,
this method has been criticized, since it relies on the assumption that the residuals follow
a normal distribution, and are homoscedastic in the participation equation. Any viola-
tion of the assumptions will result in biased and inconsistent estimation results. Sam and
Zheng (2010) (henceforth SZ) hence propose a two-step estimator similar in spirit to SY
that uses Klein and Spady (1993) (hereafter denoted by KS) semiparametric single-index
model instead of a probit regression in the first step. The semiparametric KS estimator
makes no distributional assumptions, but it assumes a linear index function to avoid the
curse of dimensionality. Being asymptotically efficient in the sense that it attains the semi-
parametric efficiency bound, it is the most efficient two-step estimator compared to other
semiparametric estimators. Moreover, KS perform Monte Carlo simulations which indi-
cate that their estimator is considerably more accurate than a probit estimation when the
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errors are not normally distributed. In contrast, the efficiency losses are modest when the
error distribution is standard normal.
Both methods start with an estimation of the participation equations:
P(w∗ij = 1|Zj) = Fi(γiZj). (4)
Whereas the probit model assumes Fi(·) being the normal cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf), the semiparametric method estimates the coefficients γˆi and the unknown






w∗ijlog(Fˆi(γiZj)) + (1 − w∗ij)log(1 − Fˆi(γiZj))
)
. (5)





where all variables are defined as before, and λi(·) is a selection control function. If the
error term is normally distributed (SY), λi(·) is simply the Heckman (1979) control term
θi
φ(γˆiZj)
(γˆiZj) , where(·) denotes the cdf, φ(·) is the normal probability density function (pdf),
and θi are coefficients to be estimated.
Applying the SZ method, λi(·) is unknown because the distribution of the error terms
is not specified. To estimate the control term, Newey (1999) approximates λi(·) with a





ij = (1, θi2τij, θi3τ 2ij , . . . , θiKτK−1ij ), (7)
where the first term cannot be identified separately from the constant term. Here, the
order K is chosen such as to minimize the mean squared error for each equation.
We use a power series of inverse Mill’s ratio of the normalized estimated index.8 The
semiparamteric estimator imposes a scale and location normalization for identification.
To reverse it, we use the constant and slope coefficients, π0 and π1, respectively, that we
obtain from a probit estimation of w∗ij on the index (γˆiZj). The inverse Mill’s ratio of the
normalized estimated index is then:
τij = φ(πˆ0 + πˆ1(γˆiZj)/(πˆ0 + πˆ1(γˆiZj)). (8)
The first order term is hence the Heckman correction, and will be sufficient if the error
term is normally distributed.
The SZ method assumes a more general form of equation (4). Therefore, it has the
advantages of generating consistent and efficient estimates without relying on distribution
assumptions, and accommodating a certain form of heteroscedasticity. Since semipara-
metric methods are extremely computationally demanding, the SY method is preferred
if its assumptions are not violated. To exploit the information contained in the cross
equation error correlations, the system of equations is estimated jointly for the full
household sample using iterative nonlinear SUR (with both methods).9
4.3 Endogeneity of remittances
In a thought experiment whereby a number of households are randomly drawn from the
population, and subsequently “treated” with remittance receipt, the impact of remittances
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on household expenditure patterns could be examined. As such an experiment is not pos-
sible, the problem of endogeneity arises, i.e. the variable remittance receipt is correlated
with the residual. Migration of one household member is a precondition for the receipt
of remittances. The occurrence of one member migrating depends heavily on household
characteristics. Variables that may “explain” migration may also be correlated with house-
hold expenditure patterns. These variables may include observable characteristics, such
as household income and the educational level, as well as unobservable characteristics
like the degree of risk aversion or ambition. In the absence of random assignment, an esti-
mation strategy that allows for identification of the treatment effect has to be employed,
such as a matching procedure, difference-in-difference estimation or an instrumental
variable (IV) approach. McKenzie et al. (2010) use a natural experiment to compare dif-
ferent methods in estimating the income gains from migration. Their findings suggest
that migration selects on both, observable and unobservable characteristics, and that an
IV approach with good instruments works best among the non-experimental methods.
Although an IV approach is preferable, it relies heavily on the exogeneity assumption.
Variables which explain remittance receipt but are uncorrelated with the expenditure
patterns have to be employed. In this study, identification of the causal effect (the local
average treatment effect LATE) relies on instruments that exploit information on former
remittance receipt within the community. From the ECV-4, the previous round of the
survey, we construct the variable “Remittances in the community in 1999” which is the
proportion of remittance receiving households in the community in the year 1999. This
variable is interacted with the proportion of household members with secondary and ter-
tiary education, respectively, to allow for the variability of the instrument at the household
level (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006); Hanson and Woodruff (2003)). Justification
lies in the fact that historical migration developed networks which can promote future
migration. On the other hand, historical migration rates are exogenous as they occurred
in the past, and are hence not affecting current consumption.
4.4 Endogeneity of gender
Next, we turn to the gender-dimension of our analysis. Table 2 has already shown that
household characteristics differ substantially for female andmale headed households. The
gender of the household head is likely to be correlated with the residual, i.e. gender is
endogenous. The impact of remittances will be different even in the absence of gender-
specific preferences. To make female and male headed households comparable, this study
uses a matching procedure.10 The idea behind matching is to find for each “treated”
observation (i.e. female headed household) its “non treated” or “control” counterpart (i.e.
male headed household) with equal characteristics. If the number of variables is large or
variables take on many values (like total per-capita expenditures here), exact matching
becomes impossible. Common practice is then to use some form of inexact matching that
balances the covariates as well as possible. The idea of coarsened exact matching (CEM)
developed by Blackwell et al. (2009) is to coarsen each variable into groups, for example,
we split total household expenditures by quartile. Subsequently, a set of strata is created
which contain all observations with the same values of the coarsened data. One possible
stratum hence may contain all individuals from the first expenditure quartile, which live
in an urban area, have no children, etc.. Observations in strata that contain at least one
treated and one control unit are retained, and units in the remaining strata are removed
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from the sample. If a stratum does not contain the same number of treated and control
units, observations are randomly dropped to obtain the same number.
5 Results
5.1 The impact of remittance receipt
To address the possible problem of endogeneity, the probability of remittance receipt is
estimated in the first stage (see the first column of Table 3). The probability increases
with per-capita expenditures; migration is very expensive, only wealthier households can
afford it, and consequently receive remittances. The positive impact of secondary and
tertiary education, respectively, detects that migration selects positively on education.
Households in rural areas are less likely to receive the inflows. The key instruments,
“Remittances in the community in 1999” and its interaction with the proportion of house-
hold members with secondary and tertiary education, respectively, are significant at the
0.1 percent level. This suggests that the instruments provide strong support for identifi-
cation. A higher incidence of prior remittances in the community increases the likelihood
of remittance receipt. This effect vanishes, however, with the educational level.
A range of Wu-Hausman tests confirm the necessity to identify causal effects: remit-
tances are highly correlated with the error term in each expenditure category (see
Appendix). Performed Sargan tests do not reject that the error term is uncorrelated with
the instruments which suggests that our instruments are valid. Moreover, the first stage
Table 3 First stage estimates of the IVs
Dependent variable: Remittance receipt
Gender of the household head Both Male Female
Log(per-capita expenditures) 0.035*** 0.073*** 0.071***
(0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Log(household size) 0.050*** 0.098*** 0.102***
(0.007) (0.018) (0.018)
Prop. of children < 15 -0.032 0.119* 0.087
(0.017) (0.050) (0.044)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with prim. educ. -0.012 0.018 0.002
(0.015) (0.034) (0.033)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with sec. educ. 0.064*** 0.110* -0.023
(0.019) (0.047) (0.047)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with ter. educ. 0.090*** 0.089 0.052
(0.022) (0.053) (0.056)
Rural area -0.033*** -0.006 -0.039
(0.007) (0.020) (0.020)
Remittances in the community in 1999 2.069*** 2.080*** 1.721***
(0.106) (0.285) (0.239)
-sec. educ. -0.900*** -0.950 1.342*
(0.227) (0.596) (0.571)
-ter. educ. -2.031*** -1.426* -0.922
(0.256) (0.642) (0.713)
Constant -0.183*** -0.540*** -0.460***
(0.037) (0.089) (0.091)
R-squared 0.057 0.094 0.113
Observations 12488 2211 2210
F-statistic of the instruments F(3,N-k-1) 165 23 42
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (with 500 reps.): * significant at 5%; ** at 1%; *** at 0.1%.
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F-statistic of the instruments (F-test = 165) is well above the critical values outlined by
Stock and Yogo (2002) to detect weak instruments.
To test, whether the assumption of normally distributed errors (probit model) is consis-
tent with the data, Figure 1 presents the estimates from both the probit and the KSmethod
as well as the 95 percent confidence interval of the probit estimate. The more sophisti-
cated semiparametric method makes no distributional assumptions, and is therefore able
to reveal a distribution structure that may differ from the Gaussian normal distribution.
The left graph presents the estimates for the category health. The KS estimate hardly ever
lies within the 95 percent confidence interval of the probit estimate. The assumption of
normally distributed error terms has to be rejected. In the right graph, the estimates differ
only little, but significantly, for some probability values. It seems crucial to apply both the
consistent semiparametric and the commonly used and easy to implement SY method to
get consistent estimates, and to analyze how much the results from both methods differ.
The results of the nonlinear SUR estimations of the equation system are presented in
the Appendix. To account for the additional variability introduced by the two-step nature
of the estimation process and by estimating the IV, the estimates are bootstrapped (with
500 replications). Most household characteristics are highly significant which is also true
for the IV of remittance receipt. From the equation system (6) counterfactual average
budget shares can be predicted which are shown in Table 4. These are the average bud-
get shares of hypothetical households with mean Xj that differ in no characteristic but
in the probability of remittance receipt. The method allows comparing a remittance-
receiving household with its non-receiving counterpart, and the difference is the impact
of remittance receipt, the average treatment effect (ATE).
The effects are large, and the results are robust with respect to the estimation method
applied; both methods yield almost identical results. Remittance receiving households
spend 8 percentage points more on health, 4-5 percentage points more on education,
and 28 percentage points more on housing when compared to what they would spend
without the transfers. Food expenses decrease by 22 percentage points. These results are
in line with findings fromAdams and Cuecuecha (2010): remittance receiving households
spend more at the margin on housing, education, and health in Guatemala. Although the
authors evaluate the effects on the marginal budget shares based on a different modeling
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Figure 1 Distribution of KS and probit estimate.
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Table 4 Average budget shares
Parametric SY method Semiparametric KS method
Food Housing Health Education Food Housing Health Education
NR 53.52% 13.70% 1.88% 3.80% 53.54% 13.70% 1.93% 3.72%
RR 31.16% 41.33% 9.97% 8.18% 31.15% 41.32% 9.81% 8.43%
ATE -22.36% 27.63% 8.09% 4.38% -22.39% 27.63% 7.87% 4.71%
Notes: All average budget shares are estimated for household with mean values. NR = non remittance receiving households, RR =
remittance receiving households, ATE = average treatment effect.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011) find that international remittances raise health care
expenditures. Calero et al. (2009) who use the same data as this study also detect a positive
impact of remittances on schooling in Ecuador. The increase in housing expenses is in
line with the findings of Soruco et al. (2008) who analyze remittances in Ecuador; after the
loans for transportation costs are repaid, the first investment financed by remittances is
usually directed towards housing. Taylor and Mora (2006) as well as Zarate-Hoyos (2004)
provide evidence that remittances result in lower expenditures on food, and substantially
higher expenditures on housing.
5.2 The impact of gender
We match female and male headed households to make both household types compara-
ble. All explanatory variables used in the estimations are listed in the Appendix. A t-test
is performed to analyze whether significant differences in means are prevalent between
the treated and control group. While the hypothesis of “no difference in means” can be
rejected for most variables at the 5 percent level in the full sample, it cannot be rejected
in the matched subsample. However, the matching procedure reduces the number of
observations considerably. Female headed households are very different from their male
counterparts, and 300 of them were in a stratum without any control observation. Con-
sequently, they were excluded which leaves 2210 female headed households for which a
similar male headed household can be identified.
Table 3 and the Appendix present the first-stage results as well as tests of the instru-
ments, respectively, for both household types. The gender-specific first-stage results are
rather similar. Remittance receipt is more likely the higher the incidence of prior remit-
tances within the community is. Yet, while this effect is decreasing with the educational
level in male headed households, it is even increasing with the proportion of household
members with secondary education in female headed households. Sargan-tests as well
as F-tests of the instruments suggest that the instruments are valid. Wu-Hausman tests
indicate that at least in the categories “housing” and “education” remittances are highly
endogenous for both household types. When estimating a system of equations, remit-
tance receipt should either enter each equation as a variable, or should be instrumented
in each equation, which is done here.
To determine, whether the distributional assumptions made by the probit model are
consistent with the data, the participation equations are estimated by both methods. Sim-
ilar to the findings from the full sample, Figure 2 reveals that the assumptions are partly
violated. In the category “education”, the KS estimate lies within the 95 percent confidence
interval of the probit estimate. In contrast, the probit estimate is significantly lower for
low probability values in the category “health”.
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Figure 2 Distribution of KS and probit estimate: gender-specific.
The results from the iterative nonlinear SUR estimations are shown in the Appendix.
The remittance instrument is significant and has the same sign for both genders. Table 5
presents the estimated average budget shares. Although the distributional assumption of
the SY method is violated in the category health, both methods yield very similar results.
Without remittances both household types show a rather similar expenditure behav-
ior. Yet, female headed households spend slightly more on food, education, and health
than their male counterparts. The impact of remittances is also not substantially differ-
ent. Remittances decrease expenditures on food by 32 percentage points, while those
on housing, health, and education increase by 32, 8, and 4 percentage points, respec-
tively, in female headed households. In male headed households, remittances results in a
Table 5 Average budget shares: gender-specific
Parametric SY method Semiparametric KS method
Food Housing Health Education Food Housing Health Education
Female headed households
NR 60.93% 12.43% 1.71% 3.51% 61.02% 12.43% 1.51% 3.82%
RR 28.64% 43.95% 9.30% 7.95% 28.34% 43.94% 10.36% 6.99%
ATE -32.28% 31.53% 7.59% 4.44% -32.68% 31.51% 8.85% 3.16%
Male headed households
NR 52.47% 11.23% 1.13% 3.34% 52.28% 11.22% 1.41% 3.08%
RR 43.92% 39.90% 10.88% 5.41% 44.45% 39.91% 9.99% 6.41%
ATE -8.55% 28.67% 9.75% 2.07% -7.83% 28.69% 8.58% 3.33%
Notes: All average budget shares are estimated for household with mean values. NR = non remittance receiving households, RR =
remittance receiving households, ATE = average treatment effect.
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9 percentage points lower food share, and housing, health, and education increase by 29,
10, and 2 percentage points, respectively.
In a third step, the impact of the gender of the remitter and the receiver is analyzed
using a subsample of 616 remittance-receiving households. Additional covariates are
“Male migrant” and “Male receiver” which are both defined as proportional values. The
former is the proportion of male migrants, whereas the latter is the proportion of male
receivers.11 The validity of the distributional assumption made using the SY method
cannot be rejected, and hence only the SY method is performed in the following (see
Appendix). Covariates such as total per-capita expenditures and household size are with
the same sign as in the previous estimation, but overall less significant due to the much
smaller sample size (see Table 6). If the remitter is female, expenditures on education
increase by one percentage point (weakly significant). Similarly, the female sex of the
receiver results in a significant increase in education expenses by 2 percentage points.
6 Conclusions
Migration and remittances take an important position in the economy of Ecuador which
considerably affects the remaining households and the dynamics of the whole economy.
The effect on development mainly depends on the use of the international transfers,
and the literature suggests gender-specific preferences in the use of income. This study
analyzes the impact of remittances and gender on household expenditure patterns by
Table 6 Full estimates for the sample selectionmodel: themigrant
Parametric SY method
Food Housing Health Education
Log(per-capita expenditures) -0.123*** 0.054*** -0.015*** -0.028***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.003) (0.010)
Log(household size) -0.130*** 0.042** 0.002 0.010
(0.019) (0.017) (0.007) (0.029)
Prop. of children < 15 0.064 -0.028 -0.023* 0.037
(0.040) (0.036) (0.012) (0.040)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with prim. educ. -0.059 0.040 0.037*** -0.007
(0.057) (0.040) (0.013) (0.015)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with sec. educ. -0.089 0.007 0.025* -0.005
(0.058) (0.039) (0.014) (0.015)
Prop. of adults >= 15 with ter. educ. -0.118* -0.058 0.024* 0.083***
(0.061) (0.045) (0.013) (0.029)
Rural area -0.131*** 0.060*** -0.001 -0.004
(0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006)
Male receiver -0.010 -0.026 -0.001 -0.020**
(0.022) (0.020) (0.009) (0.008)
Male migrant -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.014*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.007) (0.008)
Selection term I 0.072 0.034
(0.051) (0.052)
Constant 1.681*** -0.270** 0.115*** 0.236*
(0.103) (0.120) (0.032) (0.136)
R-squared 0.245 0.070 0.273 0.463
N 616 616 616 616
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (with 500 reps.): * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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employing both parametric and semiparametric techniques. The results are very robust
with respect to the estimation method applied and illustrate that remittance receipt
enhances expenditures on education and health. The effects are large. Remittances might
hence result in a stronger human capital accumulation with positive external effects for
the rest of the economy as well. Moreover, remittances increase expenditures on housing.
While for the economy this is consumption, from the part of the migrant it is an invest-
ment and results in future savings. In addition, investment in housing may spur the local
construction sector and has a positive impact on families’ health. In order to evaluate the
overall impact on development, a well-specified growth model has to be employed which
could be a promising approach for future research.
The literature on remittances suggests that including a gender perspective is crucial.
Our findings, however, contradict this perception: the gender-specific impacts concern-
ing expenditure patterns in Ecuador are rather small. In the absence of remittances, female
household heads spend slightly more on food, education, and housing than their male
counterparts. In consequence, the family well-being and human-capital formation might
improve with a female head of the households, but the effects are small. The impact
of remittance receipt is similar for both genders: the inflows are associated with higher
expenditures on education, health, and housing and smaller food expenses. Only the
reduction in food expenses is much stronger for female headed households. In addition,
the evidence suggests that the sex of the remitter and the receiver affects the expenditure
behavior, at which the impact of the sex of the receiver seems to be more important. Both
a female migrant and a female receiver increase expenditures on education. Due to data
restrictions these aspects are rather weak and not estimated further, and more research
seems to be warranted that addresses this question in particular.
Appendix
The following appendix provides some additional tests, tables and figures of the previ-
ous estimations in section five. A range of Wu-Hausman tests to confirm the necessity
to use IVs and Sargan tests that indicate that this approach is valid are provided in
Table 7. Table 8 presents all explanatory variables disaggregated by gender as well
Table 7 Tests of the IVs
Food Housing Education Health
All households
Wu-Hausman F(1, N) 42.691 121.622 67.865 14.400
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan score χ2(2) 4.052 0.557 4.904 4.087
p-value 0.132 0.757 0.086 0.130
Female headed households
Wu-Hausman F(1, N) 21.663 48.129 20.729 3.322
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.068
Sargan score χ2(2) 1.524 1.789 3.439 0.524
p-value 0.467 0.409 0.179 0.770
Male headed households
Wu-Hausman F(1, N) 2.037 11.991 7.540 0.077
p-value 0.154 0.001 0.006 0.781
Sargan score χ2(2) 0.013 1.802 3.562 2.221
p-value 0.994 0.406 0.168 0.329
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as t-tests that analyze indicate whether significant differences in means are prevalent
between male and female headed households before and after matching. Table 9 and 10
show the full estimation results for the full sample and gender subsamples, respectively.
Figure 3 presents the first step estimates from both the probit and the KS method for the
migrant subsample.
Table 8 Balancing
Full sample Matched sample
Gender of the household head Male Female Male Female
Log(per-capita expenditures) 6.753 6.831* 6.863 6.815
Log(household size) 1.322 1.037* 1.064 1.064
Prop. of children < 15 0.287 0.261* 0.207 0.218
Prop. of adults >= 15 with prim. educ. 0.454 0.433* 0.427 0.449
Prop. of adults >= 15 with sec. educ. 0.294 0.271* 0.275 0.262
Prop. of adults >= 15 with ter. educ. 0.162 0.162 0.173 0.156
Rural area 1.450 1.365* 1.367 1.367
Remittance receipt (%) 0.134 0.252* 0.207 0.207
Note: The difference between male and female headed households is significant * at 5%.
Table 9 Full estimates for the sample selectionmodels
Parametric SY method Semiparametric KS method
Food Housing Health Education Food Housing Health Education
Log(exp) -0.080*** 0.010** -0.013*** -0.029*** -0.080*** 0.010** -0.022* -0.029***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004)
Log(hh) -0.108*** 0.014*** -0.011*** 0.000 -0.108*** 0.014*** -0.007* -0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007)
Child. 0.091*** -0.062*** -0.025*** -0.018 0.090*** -0.062*** -0.024*** -0.021*
(0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Prim. -0.119*** 0.039*** 0.009* -0.004 -0.116*** 0.039*** 0.013*** 0.008
(0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
Sec. -0.203*** 0.045*** 0.004 0.008 -0.200*** 0.045*** 0.006 0.019*
(0.012) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
Ter. -0.320*** 0.088*** 0.013** 0.057*** -0.317*** 0.088*** 0.018*** 0.066***
(0.012) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.010)
Rural -0.044*** 0.011** 0.009*** -0.005* -0.044*** 0.011** 0.008*** -0.005*
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
IV -0.224*** 0.276*** 0.089*** 0.066*** -0.224*** 0.276*** 0.087*** 0.071***
(0.032) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012) (0.032) (0.025) (0.013) (0.012)
S I -0.006 0.006 -0.092 -0.001





C 1.416*** 0.011 0.112*** 0.253*** 1.416*** 0.011 0.191 0.250***
(0.032) (0.026) (0.012) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) (0.119) (0.033)
R2 0.259 0.054 0.209 0.396 0.259 0.054 0.209 0.396
N 12488 12488 12488 12488 12488 12488 12488 12488
Notes: For a description of the explanatory variables see Table 8. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (with 500 reps.):
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%.
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Table 10 Full estimates for the sample selectionmodels: gender-specific
Parametric SY method Semiparametric KS method
Food Housing Health Education Food Housing Health Education
Female headed households
Log(exp) -0.024* -0.023** -0.020*** -0.036*** -0.022* -0.022** -0.057*** -0.035***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) (0.009)
Log(hh) -0.070*** -0.041*** -0.021** -0.019 -0.069*** -0.041*** -0.015** -0.028*
(0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.020) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.014)
Child. 0.121*** -0.065*** -0.027*** 0.010 0.123*** -0.065*** -0.030*** 0.020
(0.026) (0.019) (0.008) (0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.008) (0.014)
Prim. -0.119*** 0.060*** 0.016* 0.007 -0.119*** 0.061*** 0.017** 0.013
(0.021) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) (0.006) (0.012)
Sec. -0.217*** 0.088*** 0.010 0.016 -0.218*** 0.087*** 0.011 0.023
(0.025) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013) (0.025) (0.017) (0.008) (0.013)
Ter. -0.386*** 0.139*** 0.021* 0.085*** -0.386*** 0.139*** 0.025** 0.111***
(0.026) (0.018) (0.009) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) (0.008) (0.016)
Rural -0.023 -0.006 0.006 -0.007 -0.022 -0.006 0.008 0.004
(0.013) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007)
IV -0.323*** 0.315*** 0.087*** 0.076** -0.327*** 0.315*** 0.101*** 0.054*
(0.054) (0.043) (0.020) (0.028) (0.054) (0.043) (0.021) (0.027)
S I -0.005 0.017 -1.772 -0.004





R2 0.259 0.084 0.214 0.398 0.259 0.084 0.216 0.406
N 2210 2210 2210 2210 2210 2210 2210 2210
Male headed households
Log(exp) -0.061*** -0.017* -0.016*** 0.033*** -0.061*** -0.017* -0.012** -0.033***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010)
Log(hh) -0.073*** 0.002 -0.015* -0.003 -0.073*** 0.002 -0.007 0.009
(0.015) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.018)
Child. 0.078* -0.135*** -0.044*** -0.030 0.079* -0.135*** -0.042*** 0.001
(0.031) (0.024) (0.010) (0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.010) (0.027)
Prim. -0.136*** 0.018 0.008 -0.014 -0.135*** 0.018 0.018* -0.014
(0.023) (0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.007) (0.011)
Sec. -0.214*** 0.023 0.002 0.012 -0.212*** 0.023 0.015 0.018
(0.027) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.027) (0.017) (0.008) (0.011)
Ter. -0.347*** 0.076*** 0.012 0.043** -0.345*** 0.076*** 0.023** 0.056***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.012) (0.014) (0.029) (0.021) (0.009) (0.015)
Rural 0.011 -0.021* 0.012* -0.023*** 0.012 -0.021* 0.009 -0.024***
(0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
IV -0.086 0.287*** 0.113** 0.038 -0.078 0.287*** 0.099** 0.061
(0.085) (0.068) (0.042) (0.040) (0.085) (0.068) (0.038) (0.053)
S I 0.000 0.004 0.011 0.038
(0.023) (0.023) (0.063) (0.023)
S II 0.052
(0.051)
R2 0.258 0.059 0.203 0.383 0.258 0.059 0.207 0.386
N 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211 2211
Notes: The regressions include a constant (not shown). For a description of the explanatory variables see Table 8. Bootstrapped
standard errors in parentheses (with 500 reps.):
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%.
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Figure 3 Distribution of KS and probit estimate: migrant subsample.
Endnotes
1 In the subsequent empirical analysis, we construct an instrument on the basis of past
remittance receipt within the community. Information from the previous round, ECV-4,
are used which does not contain data from the Amazonas region.
2 A household with an income of US$ 300 which spends US$ 50 on food, but receives
costless food for US$ 200 is counted as a household with an income of US$ 500 spending
US$ 250 on food.
3 Some destination countries like the United States have a strong demand for less quali-
fied labor in the construction or agriculture sector, and therefore attract male migrants.
In contrast, the need for workers in areas such as care, gastronomy or cleaning in coun-
tries like Spain favors female migration (Pfeiffer and Taylor (2008)).
4 Female migrants are more often employed in the informal sector, and therefore receive
less income than their male counterparts.
5 If prices are available, the model can easily be extended to the widely applied Almost
Ideal Demand System (AIDS) from Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
6 Following Taylor and Mora (2006), regional dummies as well as the variable “access to
the house” are included. It indicates the main access to the house, ranging from “sea/
river” and “trail” to “highway”. If households are poorly connected to markets that may
explain, whether they spend on a specific good/ category. Yet, once they do spend, this
should not affect the amount spent.








, where ϑij = γiZj and the bandwidth h is a non-stochastic
window. Estimates are obtained using the R np package developed by Hayfield and Racine
(2008) that employs automatic (data-driven) bandwidth selection via cross validation. To
ensure identification, the intercept is constrained to zero and the coefficient of one con-
tinuous regressor to one.
8 Other power series that we consider include: (i) the index γˆiZj itself, and (ii) the normal
cdf . Estimates are robust to the exact form of the approximation.
9 Due to the criterion of additivity, the variance-covariance matrix of error terms for a
complete equation demand system will be singular. With the SY correction method, the
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error terms do not sum up to zero by construction. Consequently, the budget shares do
only almost equal one. Nevertheless, this makes convergence difficult. The normal pro-
cedure is to delete one of the equations, here the miscellaneous category “other”, from the
system. As no censoring is present in the categories “food” and “housing”, both enter the
system as in equation (1).
10 Note, that to control for the endogeneity of remittances and gender different methods
are used. Matching is a procedure that eliminates endogeneity insofar as that afterwards
both groups have exactly the same characteristics, i.e. observables. Thus, gender is not
correlated anymore with the residual. However, matching does not eliminate any bias due
to unobservables which is essential in the analysis of remittances. Yet, it would be very
difficult to find a reasonable instrument for gender, and therefore matching is the chosen
technique here.
11 In 70 percent of all households, only one person receives the remittance, and 77 percent
of all households have only one migrant. The results are robust to restricting the analysis
to those observations.
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